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NOTE AND COMMENT
PcBLIC UTILITY v ALUATIONS AND RATSS.-In comparing the reports of
the public utility commissions with the decisions of the courts on questions
of valuation of public utilities, nothing is more striking than this-that as
time goes on the commissions are growingly impatient of the cost of reproduction theory, while the courts still insist there is no inflexible method of
fixing value, but continue to prefer largely figures as to supposed reproduction cost. This attitude of the commissions is remarkable in view of the
fact that every finding may be carried to the courts for review and possible
reversal. The Illinois Commission reluctantly obeyed the direct orders of
the Supreme Court to consider cost of reproduction, but refuses to treat
that as the only basis. Re Springfield Consol. Ry. Co., P. U. R. 1920 E. 474,
480. The Interstate Commerce Commission ruled that it was practically
impossible for it to find such value in the appraisal of lands of railroads as
ordered by Congress in 1912. But the Supreme Court said it must do so
because Congress had ordered it. U. S. v. lllterstate Com. Com., 252 U. S.
178. This was taken by many as an approval by the Supreme Court of the
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Cost of Reproduction as the base of value, but that question was not involved.
The North Dakota Commission believes that wherever possible in cases
involving a rate basis original cost data should be considered in finding
present value, but finds the facts as to original cost not usually available.
Fargo v. Union Light Co., P. U. R. 1920 A 764 It therefore falls back on
the broad· generalizations of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S • .¢6. Those generalizations were doubtless wise in 1898, but in 1921, valuation should be on a much
more definite basis. The Vermont Commission regarded estimated cost of
reproduction new as defective, even if allowance be made for depreciation,
first, because based on abnormally high costs of labor and materials, and second, because security holders should be entitled to a reasonable return upon
investment. Therefore effort should be made to determine actual cost. Re
Colonial Power & L. Co., P. U. R. 1920 A 215. However, original cost ·alone,
even if known, cannot be taken as a proper basis, says the Commission in
Milne v. Montpelier & Barre L. & P. C~., P. U. R. 1920 E 558. This is the
attitude of many courts. It does not seem logical to the Michigan Commission that the customers of a public utility should be required to pay a higher
rate merely to enable i utility, without the expenditure of a single dollar
towards an increase of its capital investment, to profit from a high level of
prices. Holland v. Maguire, P. U .. R. 1920 B 149. It might be added that
it is very logical to ask the users to pay. the utility a return on capital that is
invested at present high prices in order to furnish proper service, even though
prices later may fall to a far lower level. The Tennessee Commission based
rates upon a fair and adequate return upon the capital which had been invested in the property. Where the books did not show this, it was determined
by cost of reproduction at the dates of installation, i. e., by the historical, and
not the present, cost of reproduction. Re Receivers Memphis St. R. Co.,
P. U. R. 1920 C 277. Fortunately in this case the books furnished reliable
information as to actual cost in most instances. To the same effect is Re
Roanoke Waterworks Co., (Va.), P. U. R. 1920 C 745, quoting the opinion
of Hon. Chas. E. Hughes in the Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. Case, P. U. R.
1918 F 335, an opinion that has been more often approved in recent cases
before the Commissions than the decision of any court. It is quoted in nearly
all the Commission cases herein referred to, e. g., by the Utah Commission
in Re Utah Gas and Coke Co., P. U. R. 1920 C 854, holding that there cannot be a disturbing of valuations theretofore fixed every time a change occurs
in unit prices. See also Re Southern Pac. Co., (Nev.), P. U. R. 1920 F 725,
775, and Re Douglas Co. L. & W. Co., (Oreg.), P. U. R. 1920 E 66], 674,
showing the effect of the cost of reproduction method in placing public
utilities on the plane of pri~te speculative enterprises. Preference for the
original cost method, if a single test is to be applied, is expressed by the
New Hampshire Commission in Concord G. L. Co. referred to in P. U. R.
Mar. 3, 1921, vi.
In Maires v. Flatbush Co., P. U. R. 1920 E 930, the New York Commission, First District, gives a long and careful discussion of bases of rate
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regulation, especially as affected "in the present juncture of universal upheaval." It points out that "value" of property as a rate base is not "value"
as applied to private property, and denies the deductions made from the
decisions as to the reproduction cost. That basis was resorted to because
actual expenditures could not be determined, or had not been prudently
made. It was a mere "rule of convenience", and "original cost of property
as a controlling factor in a rate base has been approved" by certain New
York courts. The advantages of the "Actual Cost" method under the uniform system of accounts are pointed out, and the trend of decisions by regulatory commissions in favor of giving controlling weight to that method is
dwelt upon, with many citations. The Commission for the Second District
also approves, especially under the New York statute, the capital actually
invested as the basis of return.. Re Sea Cliff, etc. Gas Co., P. U. R. 1921
A 2II.
In Re York County Water Co., P. U. R. 1921 A 439, the Maine Commission claims that a very substantial number of commissions now believe
that "the money actually invested in an honest and prudent manner" is "a
better basis for the ascertainment of fair value" than "an attempt to apply
the reproduction less depreciation theory", which in many instances results
"in ridiculous exaggerations of .actual or probable conditions". This idea
was further elaborated and insisted upon by the same Commission in Re
Lewiston Gas L. Co., P. U. R. 1921 A 561, 571. In Re La Porte Gas & E.
C(}., (Ind.), P. U. R. 1920 F 586, 594-8, the Commission objected to givi_ng
much weight to cost of reproduction at present abnormal prices, the weight
to vary with the degree of departure from normal cost, the greater the
departure the less the weight. Many of the mental processes in fixing going
value are described as "whimsical adventure in an unblazed forest of speculation." In Re La Porte Gas & E. Co., (Ind.), P. U. R. 1921 A 824, 843,
85g, the Commission regards with concern, as inconsistent, unsound, uneconomic, and inequitable, the New Jersey case of Elizabethtown Gas L. Co.
v. Pub. Utility Comni., III At!. 729, post. See also Re Central Union Tel.
Co., (Ind.), P. U. R. 1921 B 813, 825. Present cost investment was used as
a base on the facts of the case in Re Houghto1i Cout!Jy Tra,ction Co.,
(Mich,), P. U. R. 1920 E 350, was regarded as worthy of serious consideration in Re Chesap~ke & Potomac Tel. Co., (Va.), P. U. R. 1920 F 49, 88, recognizing the wide disagreement between courts and commissions, and was considered the most equitable basis in Re Chesapeake & PQtomac Tel. Co., (W.
Va.), P. U. R. 1921 B 97, 108: The Illinois Commission, while compelled
under the decision of the Supreme Court to consider cost of reproduction,
refused to base a value on that without a showing of original cost. The
Supreme Court has taken a similar stand, flatly refusing to take cost of reproduction as the sole basis of value. State Pub. Utilities Com. v. Springfield
G. & E. Co., (Ill.), 125 N. E. 8g1. An interesting history of the cost of reproduction method, at first advocated by the public and repudiated by the
utilities, now insisted upon by the utilities and decried by the public, is found
in Re St. ]Qseph Ry. L. H. & P. Co., (Mo.), P. U. R. 1920 A 5.ia In.
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Whitehead v. Niagara Falls G. & E. Co., P. U. R. 1920 C 265, the New York
Commission, Second District, refused to add to the investment actually made
an increase based on advanced costs of present day construction.
It must be admitted, however, that there is very little in recent decisions
of the courts to show any considerable judicial trend in this same direction,
though present conditions often compel the courts to restrict severely the
use of cost of reproduction. In Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, 26-; Fed.
231, Learned Hand, J., does not hesitate to take the burr in his firm grasp.
He scorns the statement that cost of reproduction and original cost are each
elements to be considered, as meaning nothing unless that the two are to be
averaged, which no one will support. He seems right a,bout this, but he does
not shrink from the full acceptance of cost of reproduction as a rate base,
with a continued, but not quite continuous, reappraisal of plants, and rising
and falling of rates. That present value is hard to prove is no answer. He
is prepared to allow the "fallen dollar", by which "the company gains nothing, the customers lose nothing."
In Elizabethtown Gas L. c(). v. Pub. Util. Com., III A~l. 729, Justice
Swayze, quoting Lincoln Gas & E. Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, plants the
New Jersey court squarely for allowing present values, and considers that
the dollar has depreciated one half, while interest rates have practically
doubled. Does he approve doubling .the fair value, and then doubling the
rate on this doubled base value? The decision is cited with approval in St.
Joseph R. L. H. & P. Co. v. Pub-.. Sero. Com., 268 Fed. 267, which disapproved the method of valuation adopted by the Commission relying on original cost when obtain;ible. But see the severe criticisms by the Indiana Commission in Re La Porte Gas & E. Co1, P. U. R. 1921 A 824, 250-200. In
Housto1i Elec. Co. v. Houston, 265 Fed. 36o, the court disapproved confining
the plaintiff to the cost basis, arid the Michigan court in Detroit v. Michigan
R. Co., 177 N. W. 3o6, approved the cost of reproduction less depreciation
method of appraisal for rate purposes. The actual cost was shown to be
$7,299,148, and estimates of present value were $8,000,000, $10,913,191 and
$12,974937 I There was a record of over two thousand pages. Valuation
methods with such results at such cost leave something to be desired. In
Kings County L. Co. v. Lewis, 18o N. Y. Suppl. 570, the New York Supreme
Court, New York County, refused to agree with the contention of the utility
for cost of reproduction, or of the city for actual original cost, as the proper
basis, or to admit that there could be any hard and fast rule. To the same
effect is People v. Pub. Sero. Comm., 186 N. Y. Suppl. 177. But in Winona
v. Wisconsin-Minnesota L. & P. Co., (Fed.), P. U. R. 1921 A 146, the court
flatly holds a rate ordinance must be considered with reference to present
day, and not pre-war values.
The conclusion of this review of recent cases is that the Commissions,
working at first hand with the practical problems of valuation generally lean
more and~ more decidedly toward fixing value-so-called-of public utilities
on prudent investment, largely, and in not a few cases wholly. The courts,
on the other hand, still wallow in the uncertainties of the rule, which is
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scarcely a rule at all, of S1nyth v. Ames, making value a question of judgment. In the cases, judgments continue to vary as widely as ever. The
courts are probably too firmly committed to a consideration of various elements to expect them to adopt the definite rule of fixing base values on prudent investment. Whether legislatures will step in here, and whether a legislative act making prudent investment the basis would be held to be constitutional is for the future to reveal. For a fuller discussion of these methods
of valuation see 15 M1cH. L. Rr:v. 205.
E. C. G.
Due PROCESS oF LAW IN PROCE1>URE. - There are two classes of cases
which may arise under the "due process" provisions of the 5th and 14th
Amendments of the United States Constitution, so far as rules of procedure
are concerned. One embraces cases of new remedial processes which may
be criticized as too radical. The other consists of cases of old processes
which may be criticized as obsolete and out of harmony with prevailing conceptions of justice. Due process may thus be said to fill the wide space between those innovations which carry us so far away from established methods as to remove the safeguards which are deemed essential to the protection
of person and property, and those ancient remedies which enlightened modern
opinion condemns as barbarous.
Most of the cases which have come before the courts belong to the first
class, and in dealing with them the problem has been how to determine the
point at which departure from settled usage becomes so great as to undermine what are considered the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
Certainly the procedure in England at the time of the .emigration cannot be
"fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straight-jacket only to be
unloosed by constitutional amendment". Twining v. New Jersey, 2u U. S.

78,

IOI.

But the cases falling into the second class are much less numerous. It
has been said that a process is due process of law if it can show the sanction
of settled usage both in England and this country. Hurtado v. California,
no U. S. 516. It would seem reasonable, however, to assume that the settled
usage might become so remote in point of time and so out of harmony with
contemporary ideas, as to cease to enjoy the quality of due process.
This argument was made in Miedr.eich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236,
against the ancient rule that a sheriff's return cannot be falsified in the action
in which it is made, and that a party not served with process, who is thereby
deprived of his day in court, may nevertheless lose his property by judicial
sale on a default judgment based on a false return, without being allowed
to show that he was never in fact served. It appeared, however, that this
rule of the ancient common law was still currently adhered to in a number
of American states, and the Supreme Court of the United States felt itself
unable to say that the rule was inconsistent with the due process clause of
the 14th Amendment.
A more striking case of the same type has just come before the Supreme
Court. In Ownbey v. Joh11 Pierpont Morga1~, et al., U. S. Sup. Ct., April
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II, 1921, No. 99, an action was commenced by attachment in Delaware against
a non-resident. The defendant attempted to appear, but was refused the
right to do so unless he put in special bail to the amount of the value of the
property held under the attachment. This was the statutory rule in Delaware, and the defendant, who was unable to put in the special bail, attacked
the rule as operating to deprive him of property without due process of law.
It appeared that this harsh rule was derived from the Custom of London
in foreign attachment, and had been brought over to America by the colonists,
and that in Delaware it could show statutory continuity down to the present
time. The court cites a number of cases from other seaboard states where
the Custom of London also obtained a foothold, but an investigation of the
statutory history of the rule in those states seems to indicate that in every
one of them the rule long since succumbed to the progress of enlightened
civilization and passed over the Styx into the shadowy land of legal tradition
where the ghosts of ancient laws wander restlessly forever. Sodom was
thought worthy of being saved if but ten righteous men could be found
there, and it is possible that our constitution should be equally charitable toward any medieval custom which could show the endorsement of even a
single modern jurisdiction. But the court took a rather cheerless view of
the purpose of the constitution, saying that, "However desirable it is that
the old forms of procedure be improved with the progress of time, it cannot
rightly be said that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes a universal and
self-executing remedy. Its function is negative, not affirmative, and it carries
no mandate for particular measures of reform." This sounds like the exclusion from the purview of the constitution of practically all cases of outgrown processes, and would probably justify the current use of trial by
battle. But the court may not have intended to take such broad ground
against rising standards of justice. Its decision is probably correct, but its
r~ons seem to accord too high a degree of respectability to the lingering
relics of a ruder age.
E. R. S.

PROI'lTS FROM SAL<: 01" CAPITAL ASSETS AS INCOMt: TAXABLt UNDER
SIXTESNTH A:~n:NDMtNT.-The Supreme Court of the United States has taken
another step in clearing up the legal concept of income. In four cases,
decided March 28, 1921, the troublesome problem of whether or not profits
arising from the sale of capital assets shall be considered as income for the
purposes of the Income Tax was settled. These cases all arose under the
Income Tax act of 1916, as amended in 1917, 39 Stat., ch. 463, p. 756, 40 Stat.,
ch. 63, p. 300, and were all suits to recover taxes assessed, and paid under
protest. All involved the question of the constitutionality of the assessment
under the 16th Amendment, the contention of the taxpayer in each case being
.that the fund taxed was not "income" within the meaning of the Amendment. In Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, the plaintiff was
trustee under a will of property, the net income of which was to be paid to
the testator's widow for life, and after her death, to the children until each
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should become twenty-five years of age, when each was to receive his share
of the trust fund. Stock dividends and accretions of selling values, under
the will, were to be considered as principal, and not income, and the trustee
was given full dominion over the estate. Certain stock, worth $561,7g8 on
March 1, 1913, the effective date of the Amendment, was sold in 1917 for
$1,2&>,996.64, and the difference was taxed as income. The Supreme Court
held that it was taxable, although it was not in a course of dealing with
stocks, but a mere isolated sale. In Eldorado Coal Co. v. Mager, the plaintiff corporation sold its plant for cash in 1917, distributing the cash among
the stockholders, the corporation not being dissolved, because of unsettled
liabilities outstanding. Adding to the market value of March 1, 1913, the cost
of additions, and subtracting the depreciation, the appreciation in value after
that date was some $6,ooo, on which assessment was made, and the tax paid.
It was held that this was taxable, as in Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smieta11ka. In Goodrich v. Edwards, the plaintiff bought stock in 1912 for
$500, which was worth $695 on March 1, 1913, and sold it in 1916 for $13,931.22. He was taxed on the difference between the value on March 1, 1913,
and the selling price, and the Court sustained the tax. He also exchanged
stock in 1912 for other stock then worth $291,6oo. On March 1, 1913, it had
gone down to $148,000 and he sold it in 1916 for $269,000. He was taxed on
the difference between the value of March 1, 1913, and the selling value, but
the Court held that the Income Tax covered only actual gains, and here was
a loss. In Walsh v. Brewster, the plaintiff, who occasionally bought and sold
stocks to change his investments, bought some stock in 1909 which fell in
value by March 1, 1913. He sold it for what he paid for it, and the Court
held that there having been no actual gain, there was nothing to tax. He
also had bought some stock in 1902 for $231,300, the value of which on March
1, 1913, was $164,48o, and sold it in 1916 for $276,150. He was taxed on the
difference between the value on March 1, 1913, and the selling price. The
lower court held that it was, in any event, a conversion of capital assets,
and not taxable income, but the Supreme Court held that the actual gain to
the seller was income; i. e., the difference, here, between the purchase price
and selling price.
The Court in these cases followed its own dictum in Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U. S. 189, 207, where it gave a definition of income, saying "Income may
be defined as a gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through sale or
conversion of capital assets." That profit from the sale of capital assets was
taxable as income was specifically held under the corporation excise tax of
1909. Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U. S. 189. The Court felt
bound by the interpretation of income given in the cases under the excise
tax, although it is arguable that the word "income" might have a broader
meaning under a corporation excise tax than under an income tax calculated
to apply to private individuals as well as to corporations. As Justice Holmes
says in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, "A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in
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colo1 and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it
is used." It seems clear that the Court would decide that what was income
for the tax-collector is not income for a life tenant under a trust. See
Jordan v. Jordan, 192 Mass. 337; Thayer v. Burr, 201 N. Y. 155; and see
Ta:>: Commissioner v. Putnam, 2ZJ Mass. 522, at page 529.
Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wall. 63, was a case which came up under the
income tax of 1867. The act provided for levying annually a tax on gains,
profits and income for the year derived from any source, and provided that
in estimating the gains and profits, there should be included gains realized
within the year preceding the collection of the tax. The plaintiff exchanged
some notes for United States bonds in 1865, and sold them in 186g, at a profit,
and paid the tax on this profit, under protest. He was allowed to recover
the amount paid, because the increase in value developed over a series of
years, and so, according to the Act, could not be considered as income for
any one year. According to the terms of that Act, it was perhaps, not
necessary to decide that increase of capital assets, converted into cash, was
not income, but the court in that case, nevertheless, took the view that such
conversion could not be considered as income. The lower court, in Walsh
v. Brewster,-Brewster v. Walsh, 268 Fed. 207-took the view that the meaning of income in the 16th Amendment was no broader than in the Act of
1867. Similarity in wording would in,dicate that Congress at least had that
act in mind.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6or, decided that
taxes on income from real or personal property were direct taxes ; as being
in reality the same as a tax on the source itself. Other sorts of income, such
as salaries, were considered to be subject only to an excise tax, to which the
rule of uniformity applies. The 16th Amendment did not give Congress
power to lay any new kind of tax, but simply removed the necessity of
apportionment, and considering the source from which income is derived.
Uniformity is still necessary, where applicable. Brushaber v. Union Pacific
Rd. Co., 240 U.S. r, 17-19. In Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, Justice Holmes
gave the opinion of the court, holding that under the 16th Amendment "stock
dividends" were not taxable as income, since the shareholder continued to
have the same interest in the capital assets of the corporation that he had
before. In Eisner v. Maconiber, 252, U. S. 189, under an act of Congress
making stock dividends taxable, it was held that they could not be considered
as income, the court saying that Congress cannot by any definition it may
adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot alter the Constitution. The court
said that it was essential to distinguish between what is and what is not
income, as the term is used in ·the 16th Amendment, and apply the distinction
with regard to substance, and not form. Justice Holmes dissented here,
reiterating that, soundly considered, stock dividends were not income, but
said that the 16th Amendment was broad enough to cover it, so that it could
be made income under the Amendment. Hence, the problem, according to
the court, is simply to ascertain just what the term "income" legally defined
can include.
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It was decided in Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221, that where a corporation sells out to another corporation, and distributes the proceeds among
stockholders, if the value on the effective date of the Amendment, is the
same as the value when liquidated, after the date, there is no taxable income.
even though the stockholders get double the value of their stock. On the
other hand, in Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, where the corporation declared a dividend on surplus earnings, all of which had accrued before March
:r, 1913, the dividend declared after that date was taxable, even though made
up of capital assets, for the dividends were, to the individual, a tangible return on his stock. And if this dividend were made up partly of stock in another corporation, under the same circumstances, it is taxable; Peabody v.
Eisner, 247 U. S. 347. See Southern. Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 335,
where it was assumed that the meaning of "income" was the same as in the
corporation tax of 1909.
Had there been no corporation excise tax, it seems doubtful if the Supreme Court would have included this liquidated increment of value in capital
assets under income. That it may be desirable to tax it as income, so as to
save it from the necessity of apportionment, is, of course, of no interest
to the court. And there can be no problem of double taxation, if one pays
taxes on dividends, and then again pays taxes on profits from the sale of
the same stock, perhaps increased in value simply because it regularly paid
dividends. The court simply wants to find what is income in the commonly
accepted meaning of that term; yet what is commonly accepted as income is
itself a well•nigh impossible thing to define. Although the court must find
an act constitutional if by any reasonable meaning given to it, it can, yet in
the very nature of the problem, it must differentiate clearly between what
is and what is not income.
The court dealt in a high-handed manner with Gray v. Darlington, in
distinguishing it. The distinction made in Hays v. Gauley Mountain- Coal
Co. was followed, where it was said that the Act of 1867 did not apply to
such sales of stock unless the whole transaction was made within the year
in which the tax was sought to be collected; but the two Acts are much
alike, save that in the Act of 1916, the tax is levied on income "received" in
the year, while in" the Act of 1867, it is on income "derived." Inasmuch as
there can be no income at all until the act of conversion, it would seem that
it is both "derived" and "received" at that time, so the Acts can hardly be
distinguished on that ground. In the Darlington case, the court let in profits
from sales in the course of trade and commerce, although the transactions
did not begin and end during the year, but did not let in a sale from an isolated transaction. It would seem. that it c·onsidered that such profit was not
income, and so the court in the principal cases is virtually overruling Gray
v. Darlingto1~, in calling such profit "income." It hardly seems that the Act
of 1916 is different enough in its wording from the Act of 1867 to warrant
saying that Congress has made that income which was not income under the
former Act, in accordance with the reasoning of Justice Holmes in his dis-
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senting opinion in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, so as to drag it in under the
Sixteenth Amendment. It seems, rather, that the Supreme Court has, in a
doubtful situation, redefined income, and has thus made a distinct advance
in the legal interpretation of the term. If the law as it stands works unjustly,
it is up to Congress to change it.
G. D. C.
Nr:Gr.1GJ;:Nct oF DRIVJ;:R NOT lMPU'l'J;:D TO Gm:sT.-With the decision of the
Wisconsin court in Reiter v. Grober, et al., (Wis., 1921), 181 N. W. 739,
there fell the last stronghold of the doctrine which imputed the negligence
of the driver of a vehicle to a guest riding with him. The first American
state to adopt the doctrine first enunciated in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B.
us, was the last to throw it overboard.
To impute the negligence of one person to -another the relation between
them must be one invoking the principles of agency, or the parties mu~t be
co-operating in a common or joint en~erprise, or the relation between the
parties must have been such that the person to whom the negligence is imputed must have had the legal right to control the action of the person actually negligent. I SHURMAN & Ri;:nmr.n, LAw oF NJ;:Gr.1ci;:Ncr:, [6th Ed.], Sec.
6sa, et seq.
In Tlwrogood v. Bryan (supra.), an English court first held that a passenger in a public vehicle, though having no control over the driver, must be
held to be· so identified with the vehicle as to be chargeable with any negligence on the part of the driver which contributed ito an injury inflicted upon
such passenger by the negligence of a third party. This was but an attempted
extended application of the old Roman doctrine of identification, and has been
practically unanimously refused and denied in the United States. Little v.
Hackett, u6 U. S. 366, 29 L. Ed. 652. In England, too, it was early recognized that the Thorogood decision rested "upon reasons inconclusive and unsatisfactory'' and the case was over-ruled in The Bernina, 12 Prob. Div. s8,
13 App. Cas. l.
While the doctrine was thus met with opposition upon all sides when
applied to• public conveyances, a remnant of it remained, when the Wisconsin
court in Houfe v. Fulton, 29 Wis. 2¢, 9 Am. Rep. s68, and in Priedeau~ v.
Mineral Point, 43 Wis. s13, 28 Am. Rep. ssB, adopted it in the case of passengers riding in private vehicles. This new theory, attacked when first
enunciated and since as "resting upon no sound legal basis either as to
agency or identity", Reiter v. Grober (supra), was repudiated by most courts,
yet followed for a time in Montana and Nebraska. Whittaker v. Helena,
14 Mont. 124, 3S Pac. 904; Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627, 67 N.
W. s6g. But Montana repudiated the doctrine in lgo8 in Sherris v. Northern
Pac. R. Co., SS Mo.nt. l8g, l7S Pac. 26g, and Nebraska dropped even earlier
in Loso v. Lancaster County, 77 Neb. 466, where the court pointed out that
the doctrine of imputed negligence cannot be logically applied unless there is
some privity between driver and guest. Wisconsin stood by the principle
for which it had become sponsor for more than fifty years, following the
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case steadily either by a reaffirmance thereof or under the rule of
stare decisis. See numerous cases cited in Reiter v. Grober, (s11pra).
In support of the imputed negligence doctrine it was argued that he who
voluntarily enters the private conveyance of another voluntarily trusts his
personal safety in the conveyance to the person in control of it. The voluntary acceptance of transportation or carriage, it was reasoned, caused an
adoption of the conveyance as one's own for the time being, and an assumption of the risk of the skill and care of the person guiding it. To sanction
this line of argument in the case where the driver is not controlled by or is
in any sense the agent of the guest is "unauthorized by law and repugnant to
reason." Union P. R. Co. v. Lapsley, 51 Fed. 174· When a driver invites a
stranger to ride with him, and the stranger accepts, upon what basis can it
be said that there has by this transaction been established a relation of master
and servant, or of principal and agent? Unless the guest is. given control of
the machine no such relation is created. Dale v. Denver City Tramway Co.,
173 Fed. 787. As one court puts it, ''to create the imputation of negligence,
the passenger or guest must have assumed such control and direction of the
vehicle as to be considered in superior possession of it." Duvall v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 134 N. C. 331, 46 S. E. 750. It has even been held that
merely making suggestions to the driver as to the route to be taken, or warning the driver of the conveyance of some danger does not amount to sufficient authority or control. Zimmerman v. Union R. Co., 28 N. Y. App. Div.
445, 51 N. Y. S. I; Bergold v. Nassau Blee~ R. Co., 30 N. Y. App. Div.
438, 52 N • .Y. S. II. By the trend of authority it is also true that the doctrine
of imputed negligence will not be applied although driver and guest are fellow-servants, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McFall, 75 Ark. 30, 86 S. W. 824, or
are relatives by blood or marriage. So11thern R. Co. v. King, 128 Ga. 383,
57 S. E. 687; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. Mcintosh, 140 Ind. 261, 38 N. E.
476. Contra: Vinton v. Plainfield Tp., 208 Mich. 179, 175 N. W. 403, (father
and son).
It is interesting to note that a statute imputing the negligence of the
operator of a motor vehicle to his guest, where the guest had no control over
the operator, was held unconstitutional, as repugnant to the State and Federal Constitutions, because discriminative against persons riding in motor
vehicles, and denying the equal protection of the law to persons similarly
situated. Birmingham-Tuscaloosa Ry. & U. Co. v. Carpenter, 194 Ala. 141,
69 So. 626.
There are cases, though, where the guest is held guilty of negligence independently of imputation. Cases involving situations in which driver and
guest are engaged in a joint undertaking or where the guest is lacking in
ordinary care either in his choice of driver or in his conduct while being
driven are often treated as exceptions to the rule against imputing negligence of a driver to his guest. In truth they are hardly exceptions, but
really instances of independent acts of contributory negligence on the part
of the guest which preclude a recovery on his part for injuries inflicted upon
because of the negligence of the driver.
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Thus it has been held in one case which says that the negligence of the
driver is imputed to the guest where both are engaged in a joint enterprise,
in which the transportation is a factor, that to establish a joint adventure
"the passenger must have either express or implied right to direct the movement of the vehicle used." Robison v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co.,
90 Ore. 490, 176 Pac. 594.
The repudiation of the doctrine of imputed negligence, it must be understood, does not excuse the· passenger or guest from exercising any care.
If he does not exercise such care as a reason~bly prudent man would exercise under the circumstances he cannot recover for injuries occasioned thereby. Brommer v. Pa. R. Co., 179 Fed. 577, 103 C. C. A. 135. For a discussion
of the meaning of "due care" see 19 :Kl1cH. L. Rm. 433. In the principal
Wisconsin case the guest was being sued, and the court finding him guilty
of no active contributory negligence, absolved him from blame, even though
he happened in this case to be a part owner of the machine driven by the
negligent driver. In the earlier Wisconsin cases the court had imputed the
driver's negligence to the guest on the theory of agency; and if such agency
view was really sound, the conclusion would be almost inevitable in the principal case that the guest was liable. When the agency theory was thus really
put to the test, the court had to upset some of its earlier doctrine. Most
generally cases involving the contributory negligence of the guest are those
in 'Yhich a guest sues a third perso~ -whose negligence, the guest alleges,
caused the injurie"s sued upon, and the third party interposes the contributory negligence of driver and guest.
A guest has been precluded from recovery where the negligent driver operated the vehicle at excessive speed at the suggestion and directio~ of the
guest who wanted to arrive at a depot in time to meet a train, Langley v.
Southern Ry. Co., II3 S. C. 45, 101 S. E. 286; where the guest continued to
ride with full knowledge of the fact that there were no lights on a car which
was being driven on unfamiliar roads, Rebillard v, Railroad Co., 216 Fed. 503;
and where the guest remained in the machine with full knowledge of the
fact that the driver was so intoxicated as to be unable to operate the machine properly. Lynn v. Goodwin, (Cal., 1915), 148 Pac. 927.
All these are really examples of independent negligence on the part of
the guest. The old doctrine of imputed negligence must now be regarded as
thoroughly exploded.
H. A. A.
Tm: N~WBJ";RRY CAs~-Senator Newberry of Michigan and sixteen others
were convicted in the United States District Court on the charge that they
"unlawfully and feloniously did conspire, combine, confederate, and agree
together to commit the offense [in the Newberry indictment] on his part
of wilfully violating the act of Congress approved June 25, 1910, as amended,
by giving, contributing, expending, and using and by causing to be given,
contributed, expended and used in procuring his nomination and election at
said primary and general elections, a greater sum than the laws of Michigan
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permitted and above ten thousand dollars,'' etc. The Act of Congress ref erred to (c. 392, 36 Stat. 822-824, amended c. 33, 37 Stat. 2s-29) commonly
known as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, provides: "No candidate for
Representative in Congress or for Senator of the United States shall give,
contribute, expend, use, or promise, or cause to be given, contributed, expended, used, or promised, in procuring his nomination and election, any
sum, in the aggregate, in excess of the amount which he may lawfully give,
contribute, expend, or promise under the laws of the state in which he resides," etc. This Act read in connection with the Michigan statute fixed the
maximum sum so allowed to be expended by a candidate for the United States
Senate at $3,750. The trial court overruled a demurrer challenging the constitutionality of the Act of Congress.
On the trial the court (Judge Sessions) charged the jury inter alia as
follows:
(c) "To apply these rules to this case: If you are satisfied from
the evidence that the defendant, Truman H. Newberry at or about
the time that he became a candidate for United States Senator was
informed and knew that his campaign for the nomination and election
would require the expenditure and use of more money than is permitted by law and with such knowledge became a candidate, and
thereafter by advice, by conduct, by his acts, by his direction, by his
counsel, or by his procurement he actively participated and took part
in the expenditure and use of an excessive sum of money, of an unlawful sum of money, you will be warranted in finding 'that he did
violate this statute known as the Corrupt Practices Act."

In the Supreme Court the Justices were unanimously of the opinion that
the judgment should be reversed for error in the charge quoted, Chief Justice White referring to the charge of the trial court as a "grave misapprehension and grievous misapplication of the statute." Five members, of the
Court (McReynolds, Day, McKenna, VanDevanter, and Holmes) were of
the opinion that the Act of Congress was unconstitutional. The concurrence
of Mr. Justice McKenna, however, was with the reservation of a possible
contrary conclusion if the Seventeenth Amendment could be taken into account. Mr. Justice Pitney delivered an opinion in which Brandeis and Clark,
]. J., concurred upholding the power of Congress, while the Chief Justice in a
separate opinion arrived at the same conclusion. Truman. H. Newberry et
al v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., No. 559, May 2, 1921.
The fault found in the charge above quoted is succinctly stated by Mr.
Justice Pitney as follows:
"However this may be regarded when considered in the abstract, the
difficulty with it, when viewed in connection with the evidence in the
case to which the jury was called upon to apply it, is that it permitted
and perhaps encouraged the jury to find the defendants guilty of a
conspiracy to violate the Corrupt Practices Act if they merely con-
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templated a campaign requiring the expenditure of money beyond the
statutory limit even though Mr. Newberry, the candidate, had not,
and it was not contemplated that he should have, any part in causing
or procuring such expenditure beyond his mere standing voluntarily
as a candidate and participating in the campaign with knowledge that
moneys contributed and expended by others without his participation
were to be expended. * * *
"A reading of the entire Act makes it plain that Congress did not
intend to limit spontaneous contributions of money by others than a
candidate, nor expenditures of such money except as he should participate therein. * * * Spontaneous expenditures by others being without the scope of the prohibition, neither he nor anybody else can be
held criminally responsible for merely abetting such expenditures.
"It follows that one's entry upon a candidacy for nomination and
election as a Senator with knowledge that such candidacy will come
to naught unless supported by expenditure of money beyond the specified limit, is not within the inhibition of the Act unless it is contemplated that the candidate shall have a part in procuring the excessive
expenditures beyond the effect of his mere candidacy in evoking spontaneous contributions and expenditures by his supporters; and that his
remaining in the field and participating in the ordinary activities furnish in a general sense the 'occasion' for the expenditure is not to
be regarded as a 'causing' by the candidate of such expenditure within the meaning of the statute."
The Court's conclusion on the. interpretation of the Corrupt Practices
Act and the propriety of ·the charge to the jury are of course interesting and
important, but by far the most vital part of the case is that dealing with the
power of Congress to legislate regarding primary elections of candidates for
the National Legislature. In many of the cases involving constitutional questions decided by a divided court the differences are due to varying views as
to economic and social policies and theories. As to these one may agree or
disagree, but it is pretty difficult to say with assurance that either position is
wrong. The Newberry case, however, turns on a question which is purely
one of construction of the Constitution, and it is believed that one is warranted in saying, with all deference, that the majority conclusion is unsound.
By the Constitution it is provided : "All legislative Power herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives" (Art. I, Sec. I); "The Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places for
chusing Senators" (Art. I, Sec. 4) ; "The Congress shall have power * * *
to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Offi-
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cer thereof" (Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 18). Since Senators are officers of the United
States and the office exists solely by virtue of the Constitution we assume
that it would not be seriously questioned, if there were no other provisions
therein regarding the manner of their selection or limiting the legislative
power of the Federal Government in respect thereof, that Congress would
have plenary power over all matters relating to their choice. It has long been
settled that Congress may provide for the conduct of the election proper.
Ex parte Siiebold, zoo U. S. 371; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476.
Regulation of primaries, admittedly of no other purpose than to determine
whose names shall go on the ballots in the general election, surely would be
no farther removed from the end to be accomplished than was the creation
of the bank upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. The classic
statement by Chief Justice Marshall in that case (p. 421) seems entirely applicable: ''We think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow
to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that
body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but consist with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
Many cases might be referred to in which Congressional action has been
upheld where the immediate subject of the legislation was as far or farther
removed from the subject control over which was vested by the Constitution in federal hands, as regulation of primaries is removed from a Constitutional provision by which is created the office to be filled. See Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I (relations between common carriers and
their employes); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (registration of
man power and imposition of compulsory military service) ; United States v.
Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (punishment of the fraudulent making of spurious
interstate bills of lading) ; Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 254 (prohibition of
manufacture of non-intoxicating beer). And in In Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1,
the provision of section three Article two, that the President "shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed" was deemed sufficiently close to
the matter of protection of United States judges to support the assignment
of a deputy marshal to protect Mr. Justice Field from the Terrys.
Is there anything in the Constitution that denies or limits such power of
Congress? It may be argued that Sec. 4 of Art. I, above quoted, does so.
Surely there is nothing else that can be relied upon as even tending to uphold such a claim. It would seem perfectly apparent, however, that the section referred to is a constitutional delegation of power to the states, and
even that has a string tied to it. Were it not for the fact that five of the
members of the Supreme Court are of the opinion that Art. I, Sec. 4, is a
grant of power to Congress, in fact the only basis for any claim by Congress to control even elections of Senators and Representatives; one would

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
feel almost warranted in saying that it was absurd to contend that the section was anything other than as above stated. It is the States, not the Federal Government, that get their power from that section.
The inherent reasonableness of the view of the minority is apparent when
it is realized that in truth in a large percentage of the states it is the primary election, not the general election, that determines who the officers
shall be. The decision of the majority means that in those states Congress
is virtually helpless in the control of the selection of its own members. To
be sure seats may be denied, but at best that is an uncertain remedy, and
so far as punishment is concerned there can be none-at least so far as Congress is concerned-except in such denial of a seat.

